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OBJECTIVE: Toevaluatetheimpactofregulatoryscenar-
iosonthefinancialviabilityofmedicaldevicecompanies.
DESIGN: We developed a model to calculate the expected
net present value of a hypothetical product throughout
preclinical development, clinical testing, regulatory
approval, and postmarketing. We tested 3 scenarios:
(1) the current regulatory environment; (2) a scenario in
which medical devices are subject to the same evidence
standards required for pharmaceuticals; and (3) a
scenario consistent with the Coverage with Evidence
Development: Coverage with Study Participation (CSP)
policy proposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medic-
aid Services, whereby Medicare will pay for beneficiaries
to receive new devices that are not currently determined
to be “reasonable and necessary” if the patients partic-
ipate in clinical studies or registries.
MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: When apply-
ing assumptions consistent with the implantable
cardioverter-defibrillator market, the net present value
atthe start of development wasanestimated $553million
in the current regulatory environment, $322 million in
the pharmaceutical scenario, and $403 million in the
CSP scenario. Sensitivity analyses showed that the
deviceindustrywouldlikelybeprofitableinall3scenarios
over a range of assumptions.
CONCLUSIONS: The environment in which the medical
device industry operates is financially attractive. Fur-
thermore, when compared with the alternative of
applying the same evidence standards for pharmaceu-
ticals to medical devices, the CSP policy offers improved
financial incentives for medical device companies.
KEY WORDS: device approval; health policy; medicare; reimbursement
mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the Medicare program, reimbursement
for products and services has been based on whether these are
considered “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury”.
1 However, as rapid advances in
health care technology continue to drive medical costs upward,
it has become increasingly difficult for the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) to balance its dual responsibilities
of protecting the Medicare trust fund, while simultaneously
enhancing the welfare of beneficiaries—particularly when it
comes to coverage decisions for costly new medical devices.
2
The level of evidence supporting the safety and efficacy of
medical devices is typically less than that available for
pharmaceutical products.
3 For high-risk devices or new
devices for which there is no comparator product on the
market (class III devices), manufacturers must submit a
premarket approval application to the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), from which regulators determine whether
there is sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness for the
intended uses.
4 In practice, this standard is often met by small
clinical trials in select groups of patients. The studies often do
not employ randomized designs, and the FDA generally does
not require manufacturers to collect long-term efficacy data.
5–7
Although there have been improvements in study designs over
recent years, and experts have called for increased standard-
ization for medical devices, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997
requires that the FDA allow manufacturers to use the least bur-
densome means available to demonstrate safety and efficacy.
8
From the perspective of device manufacturers, increasing
the amount of clinical evidence required for approval or
reimbursement would create a barrier to market entry.
Manufacturers argue that the device industry is fundamental-
ly different from the pharmaceutical industry in terms of
organization size and access to capital, and that the engineer-
ing framework supporting continuous device innovation
stands in contrast to the pharmaceutical industry’s focus on
the development and testing of drugs. At the same time, the US
medical device industry is estimated to be a $74.5 billion
enterprise,
9 with substantial firms having dominant positions
in critical markets. Thus, the challenge for CMS is to craft a
standard for the reimbursement of medical devices that both
protects patient safety and preserves the incentive structure
that has spurred growth and innovation in the device industry.
To address these and other issues, CMS has proposed the
“Coverage with Evidence Development” policy, which
includes “Coverage with Appropriateness Determination”
(CAD) and “Coverage with Study Participation” (CSP).
10 In
the context of devices, the purpose of CAD is to collect
additional data to document that the use of a device accords
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mines that the information necessary for a coverage determi-
nation is not available, Medicare will reimburse for new
devices only if patients enroll in clinical studies or registries
supported by the developers of the technologies or other
related groups.
11–13 With these data, Medicare will be better
positioned to make evidence-based determinations of wheth-
er new devices are “reasonable and necessary”.
14
Although device manufacturers are likely to resist mandates
to collect additional data or other requirements that add
uncertainty to the reimbursement process, it is also likely that
the CSP strategy would be more economically attractive than a
policy requiring manufacturers to provide the higher level of
evidence usually required of pharmaceutical products in
approval and reimbursement decisions. In this paper, we use
a simple model to evaluate the financial viability of a hypothet-
ical company developing a new class III medical device in
3 regulatory scenarios that reflect different policy approaches
to this issue.
METHODS
The model calculates the expected net present value (NPV) of a
new device throughout preclinical development, clinical test-
ing, regulatory approval, and postmarketing. The NPV of a
project is the sum of the present values of all cash flows related
to the project, both negative (costs) and positive (revenues).
15
Firms commonly use NPV calculations to evaluate investment
opportunities by explicitly incorporating a stated rate of return
that reflects the cost of capital to the firm (known as the
discount rate). These discount rates can reflect the availability
of capital to the firm, the risk of the investments undertaken
by the firm, or even the stage of the investment. In risky
endeavors like drug development, in which firms can accrue
costs for several years before receiving revenues, future
revenues are discounted heavily in the calculation of NPV.
Our model focuses on the NPVof a product at the beginning
of the first year of its development (year 1). For simplicity, and
to evaluate threshold levels, we dichotomized this measure: If
the expected NPV in year 1 is positive, investment in the
device is considered economically attractive; if the expected
NPV is negative, the company or its investors will be better off
directing capital to other investments. (However, if capital or
management resources are constrained, the firm would focus
on projects with the greatest possible return for a given level
of risk.)
Regulatory Scenarios
The 3 regulatory scenarios of interest are national coverage
policies that we have termed the “current scenario”, the “CSP
scenario”, and the “pharmaceutical scenario”. The current
scenario reflects the current regulatory environment for class
III medical devices, in which the level of evidence necessary for
FDA approval is less than that required for pharmaceuticals. In
this scenario, we assume that CMS will provide payment for a
device if it is approved by the FDA, but will not provide payment
for the device while it is undergoing clinical testing before
approval. In the CSP scenario, CMS will reimburse for the
device but will require Medicare beneficiaries who receive the
device to be enrolled in a clinical trial or registry. Finally, in
the pharmaceutical scenario, CMS will require that the process
of developing clinical evidence to justify coverage for a class III
medical device is as rigorous as the current FDA approval
process for pharmaceutical products.
The structure of our evaluative model is based on the
expected life cycle of the device. Compared to pharmaceutical
products, it is often difficult to discern when the life cycle of a
device begins and ends, because most devices are developed in
an incremental fashion. In our model, we assumed that
preclinical development of a new device takes approximately
3 years. We assumed that it would take 2 years to complete
clinical studies in the current and CSP scenarios and 3 years
in the pharmaceutical scenario (Table 1).
16 For all 3 scenarios,
we assumed that CMS is making a national coverage determi-
nation, and that it takes the FDA and CMS a total of 1 year to
make approval and coverage decisions.
17,18 Also, because
there are fewer regulatory hurdles slowing the entry of other
device manufacturers to market, we assumed that the period
during which the product can recoup the cost of development
is 3 years after clearance from the FDA.
Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of each regulatory
scenario. As a starting point, many of the inputs in the model
were based on the implantable cardioverter-defibrillator market;
however, the model can be applied to numerous medical devices
throughtheuseofsensitivityanalysis.In the base-case analysis,
we assumed that the probability of FDA approval and CMS
coverage for the device is 90% in the current scenario. We
applied the same probability to represent the likelihood that
CMS would require patients to be enrolled in a registry for the
CSP scenario. In the pharmaceutical scenario, we assumed
that if the required trial(s) revealed that the device is efficacious,
CMS would provide coverage. Otherwise, it would not. We
performed extensive sensitivity analyses to evaluate the impact
of changes to model parameters and to calculate break-even
Scenarios  
1 2  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Current Clinical  testing  FDA/CMS 
review 
Sales (90%)  — 
CSP Clinical  testing  FDA/CMS 
review 
CSP (90.0%)  Sales 
(68.5%) 
— 
Pharmaceutical Preclinical  development 
Preclinical development 
Preclinical development 
Clinical testing  FDA/CMS 
review 
Sales (68.5%) 
Year
3 
FDA: Food and Drug Administration; CSP: Coverage with Study Participation.
Table 1. Device Life Cycle under Three Regulatory Scenarios
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equal to zero in each scenario.
RESULTS
In the base case, estimates of NPV in year 1 were $553 million
in the current scenario, $403 million in the CSP scenario, and
$322 million in the pharmaceutical scenario, indicating that
development of a new device is an economically attractive
investment in all 3 scenarios.
In each scenario, device manufacturers spent an estimated
$60 million on preclinical development over 3 years. They
spent an estimated $18.6 million over 2 years on clinical
testing in the current and CSP scenarios, and $74.4 million
over 3 years in the pharmaceutical scenario. After a 1-year
Table 2. Assumptions in the Base-case Analysis
Assumption Current Scenario CSP Scenario Pharmaceutical Scenario
Annual cost of preclinical development
a $20 million $20 million $20 million
FDA-mandated studies
Number of patients 600
b 600
b 2,400
c
Cost to device company per patient
d $25,000 $25,000 $25,000
CSP studies
Number of patients
e – 20,000 –
Cost to device company per patient
f – $1,000 –
Probability that the device is truly effective
g 0.685 0.685 0.685
Probability of CMS coverage (traditional or CSP) after FDA approval 0.900
h 0.900
h 0.685
g,i
Probability of CMS coverage after CSP period
g,i – 0.685 –
Patients per year who will receive the device after FDA and CMS approval
j 25,000 25,000 25,000
CMS payment for the device during CSP period
k – $25,000 –
CMS payment for the device after CMS coverage approval
k $25,000 $25,000 $25,000
Cost to the device company of manufacturing the device
l $6,000 $6,000 $6,000
Discount rate
m 11% 11% 11%
FDA: Food and Drug Administration; CSP: Coverage with Study Participation, and CMS is Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
aAssumption consistent with out-of-pocket costs for preclinical development of pharmaceutical products: $121 million over 5 years.
16
bA total of 581 patients were followed for 3 to 6 months for combined cardiac resynchronization therapy and defibrillator (CRT-D; Guidant Corporation).
cConsistent with recommendations from the International Conference on Harmonization,
19 which suggest that premarket clinical safety databases include
1,500 patients for chronic medications intended to treat non-life-threatening conditions, we assumed that 2 randomized controlled trials with 600 patients
per arm are needed for FDA approval in the pharmaceutical scenario.
dTrial-related costs,
20 not including the cost of manufacturing.
eWe assumed that 20% of patients would choose not to enroll in trials or registries under the CSP policy.
fWe assumed that the per-patient cost for CSP incurred by the device company would be significantly lower than costs for clinical trial participation.
gBased on the probability that investigational drugs proceeded from phase 3 testing to marketing approval
16
hWe assumed that 90% of devices are approved by the FDA.
iWe assumed that no type 1 or type 2 errors would occur.
jEstimate based on 64,000 implantable cardioverter defibrillators inserted in 2003, 3 major manufacturers of the devices, and the majority of patients as
Medicare beneficiaries
21
kAssumption consistent with recent estimates of $18,000 to $35,000 for implantable cardioverter defibrillators
22
lCalculation based on annual report of Guidant Corporation for the cost of all goods as 24% (thus, 0:24   $25000 ¼ $6000)
23
mDiscount rate used by DiMasi et al.
16
Table 3. Sensitivity Analyses: Parameter Values When NPV=0
Variable Base-case estimate Current scenario CSP scenario Pharmaceutical scenario
Annual cost of preclinical development, $ 20 million 223.8 million 168.7 million 138.6 million
Duration of preclinical development, y* 3.00 5.47 5.32 5.04
Probability that device is truly effective, % 68.5 NA† NA† 16.7
Probability of CMS coverage in current model, % 90 9.8 NA NA
Patients receiving device each year after FDA clearance, n‡ 25,000 2,709 3,038 6,083
CMS payment (price) for device, $§ 25,000
1-year market life 7,152 10,299 15,951
2-year market life 3,743 6,011 8,142
3-year market life 2,619 4,266 5,650
4-year market life 2,061 3,381 4,429
CSP: Coverage with Study Participation; FDA: Food and Drug Administration; CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; and NPV: net present
value
*Without varying total life cycle (i.e., with 5 years for clinical development, only 1 year after FDA clearance in each scenario).
†NPV in year 1 is positive at all probabilities. In the current scenario, NPV remains constant under the assumption that evidence is not generated (by trials
or through provider experience) to demonstrate ineffectiveness. In the CSP scenario, sufficient sales are generated during the 2 years during CSP to
maintain positive NPV regardless of the probability of true effectiveness.
‡In the base-case CSP scenario, 20,000 patients received the device each year during the CSP period, and 25,000 patients received the device each year
after FDA clearance. In the break-even analysis, we assumed that the same number of patients received the device in both periods.
§We maintained the assumption that the cost of goods sold is equal to 24% of the price of the device.
52 Reed et al.: Regulatory and Reimbursement Policies for Medical Devices JGIMperiod for FDA and CMS review, expected revenue from CMS
for coverage of the device was an estimated $562.5 million per
year for 3 years in the current scenario, with the cost of goods
estimated at $135 million per year, resulting in net total cash
flow of $1.28 billion over 3 years. In the CSP scenario, CMS was
estimated to pay $450 million per year for the 2 years during the
CSP period and $428 million in the last year of the device’s
marketable life, with coverage provided by the traditional
mechanism. After subtracting the cost of manufacturing the
device and the cost of implementing CSP, the net total cash flow
was an estimated $973 million. Finally, in the pharmaceutical
scenario, annual revenues were an estimated $428 million per
year, with the cost of the devices estimated at $103 million per
year, resulting in net cash flow of $976 million.
Sensitivity Analysis
Starting with the base-case assumptions for the current
scenario, sensitivity analyses showed that payment could be
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Figure 2. Net present value in year 1 by probability that the device is effective
53 Reed et al.: Regulatory and Reimbursement Policies for Medical Devices JGIMas low as about $2,600 per device and still allow the NPV to
break even at $0 (Table 3). Payment could be as low as $4,266
per device in the CSP scenario and as low as $5,650 per device
in the pharmaceutical scenario to allow the company to
maintain a break-even NPV.
The base-case assumption of $20 million in annual costs or
$60 million in total costs for preclinical development may be an
overestimate for devices that represent incremental improve-
ments over existing products, resulting in conservative estimates
of NPV; however, this estimate may be too low for new devices. In
sensitivity analysis, we found that the annual cost of preclinical
development could be as high as $223.8 million per year in the
current scenario, $168.7 million per year in the CSP scenario,
and $138.6 million per year in the pharmaceutical scenario to
maintain a positive NPV (Fig. 1 and Table 3).
We also varied the probability that the device would be
found truly effective in more extensive clinical testing, as
required in the CSP and pharmaceutical scenarios. Given that
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life cycle in the CSP scenario, there was a relatively modest
impact on the NPV (Fig. 2). Indeed, the probability that the
device was truly effective could be as low as 0%, equivalent to
the scenario in which CMS provided coverage for the device only
during the CSP period, and the NPV would remain positive.
However, when CMS coverage depended entirely on this
probability in the pharmaceutical scenario, the NPV decreased
by $62 million for every 10% absolute decrease in the probabil-
ity that the device would be shown effective. The probability
could be as low as 16.7% to maintain a positive expected NPV.
In other sensitivity analyses, we varied the market life of the
device. If the device was used in 25,000 patients for 1 or
2 years (rather than 3 years), the NPV in year 1 remained
positive (Fig. 3). With a 3-year market life, a manufacturer
could maintain a positive NPV in all 3 scenarios with markets
as small as approximately 3,000 to 6,000 patients per year
(Table 3). Alternatively, if the market life of a product were
10 years, the number of patients receiving the device each year
could be as low as approximately 1,400 patients in the CSP
scenario and 2,500 patients in the pharmaceutical scenario.
When simultaneously varying the duration of time on the
market and the price of the device, we found that if the device
was priced at $5,000 (instead of $25,000 in the base-case
analysis), to maintain a positive NPV in year 1, the product
must remain on the market for approximately 1.5 years in the
current scenario, 2.5 years in the CSP scenario, and 3.5 years
in the pharmaceutical scenario (Fig. 4). If the device was priced
at just $2,500, the active market life of the device must be at
least 3.5 years in the current scenario, 6 years in the CSP
scenario, and 9 years in the pharmaceutical scenario (Fig. 4).
Because revenues are a function of price and market size,
varying the size of the market was expected to have an impact
similar to that of varying the price of the product. If the
product was reimbursed at $25,000, at least 2,700 patients
would have to receive the device annually to maintain a
positive NPV in the current scenario, compared to approxi-
mately 3,000 patients in the CSP scenario and 6,000 patients
in the pharmaceutical scenario.
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the CSP policy is preferable to a
system in which clinical testing for devices is held to the
evidence standards currently applied to pharmaceuticals. With
CSP, the device industry would benefit from earlier revenue
streams generated by the initiation of Medicare coverage for
products after relatively limited clinical testing, as compared to
delayed revenue streams when products are subject to more
rigorous premarket clinical testing.
Sensitivity analyses revealed that the medical device indus-
try is likely to be profitable in all 3 regulatory and reimburse-
ment scenarios over a range of assumptions of lower or higher
research and development costs, shorter or longer product
cycles, lower or higher prices, and smaller or larger markets. In
addition, the assumptions used in our base-case analysis were
conservative. For example, we estimated the undiscounted
cost of clinical trials to be relatively high in the pharmaceutical
scenario, at approximately $74 million—an amount approach-
ing the $125 million estimate for investigational pharmaceuti-
cal products.
16,18 We also assumed that the market life for the
device was just 3 years after FDA clearance. And we made the
conservative assumptionthatall FDA-approved devices would be
subject to the CSP policy in the CSP scenario. In practice, we
expect that the probability will be less than 1, even for class III
devices. Although application of CSP is in its early days, it is clear
that medical devices will not be exempt. Of the 6 national
coverage determinations currently affected by the CED policy, 2
pertaintomedicaldevices (implantable cardioverter-defibrillators
and cochlear implants).
The medical device industry is a heterogeneous mix of small
new ventures and large mature firms. Larger firms would have
the capital necessary to develop a medical device and conduct
more rigorous randomized trials to evaluate safety and efficacy,
whereas smaller firms may not. Our findings reflect an
expected NPV derived from multiplying expected revenues by
the probability that firms would receive those revenues. Given
that many smaller firms may not be able to sustain a negative
approval or coverage decision, the stakes are higher on an
individual device basis. That is, although the expected NPV is
positive, a lower probability of coverage by CMS will cause a
number of small firms to drop out of the marketplace or force
them to partner sooner with larger development firms, reduc-
ing expected returns to their investors. The ensuing impact on
the productivity of research and development across the
industry is unknown. It is possible that firms and venture
capitalists will become more risk-averse in funding the devel-
opment of innovative medical devices, or they may selectively
inhibit the development of products targeted at smaller patient
populations or those with high hurdles to reimbursement.
Although our model is largely hypothetical, it can be used to
help shape a discussion of the benefits and tradeoffs to the
device industry under various reimbursement models. None-
theless, some limitations must be considered. First, although
we included an estimate of the cost of manufacturing the
product, our analysis does not include costs to device compa-
nies for sales, marketing, and administration. An accounting
of these costs can be considered by reducing reimbursement
for the product by an estimate of the percentage of total sales
that would be allocated for these activities. For example, in the
current scenario, 67% of sales of the product could be
allocated to such expenses while allowing the firm to maintain
a positive NPV in year 1. In the CSP and pharmaceutical
scenarios, costs for sales, marketing, and administration could
be as high as 63% and 57% of sales, respectively, to maintain a
positive NPV in year 1. Another limitation is that we did not
adjust the cost of capital for the inherent risk of each stage of
the research program or additional issues that may affect
postapproval uptake of the product. One such issue is whether
payments to providers are sufficient to cover the device and
associated costs. In some cases, CMS grants additional
reimbursements for new technologies through add-on pay-
ments for inpatient services, new technology pass-through, or
new ambulatory payment classifications for outpatient ser-
vices. However, this process can take considerable time.
Although we believe our model provides a useful framework
for thoughtful discussion about the financial risks imposed on
the device market by various regulatory scenarios, the model
does not fully address other important issues. One is the value
of having high-quality information about risks and benefits of
devices after more rigorous clinical testing. Another is the
potentially lower risk of adverse events, although this is
55 Reed et al.: Regulatory and Reimbursement Policies for Medical Devices JGIMincorporated in our application of a lower probability of a device
moving to the sales phase in the CSP and pharmaceutical
scenarios. Finally, because the model inherently reflects the
perspective of the device industry, it does not incorporate effects
on consequent health care spending or the social costs and
benefitsassociated withapprovingor haltingnew medical devices.
Overall, our findings substantiate beliefs that, for some
markets, the environment in which the medical device indus-
try operates is financially attractive. Furthermore, our analysis
shows that when compared with the alternative of applying the
same evidence standards for pharmaceuticals to medical
devices, the CSP policy offers improved financial incentives
for medical device companies.
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